Regulating pacific seasonal labour in Australia by MacDermott, T & Opeskin, B
© Pacifi c Affairs: Volume 83, No. 2  June 2010 283
Regulating Pacifi c Seasonal 
Labour in Australia
Therese MacDermott and Brian Opeskin
Introduction
After many years of resisting a temporary worker scheme involving its Pacific neighbours, in August 2008 the Australian government -announced that a pilot seasonal worker scheme would be introduced 
in Australia. Four Pacifi c Island countries—Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, 
Tonga and Vanuatu—have been selected for the pilot scheme, and workers 
from these countries will be allowed to undertake low-skilled work in the 
Australian horticulture industry in nominated regional locations. A labour 
mobility scheme of this nature is a signifi cant departure from Australia’s 
previous adherence to a policy of permanent settlement and skilled migration. 
Many factors have contributed to this policy realignment, including lobbying 
from the farming sector,1 persistent pressure from Pacifi c Island countries, 
a reinvigorated engagement with the Asia Pacifi c region following a change 
of Australian government in late 2007 and New Zealand’s perceived early 
successes with a comparable seasonal work scheme.
Labour mobility schemes are often promoted as having the potential to 
achieve multiple goals. For the sending country, they are presented as part 
of a development perspective which focuses on the potential to provide 
developing communities with employment opportunities, the benefi ts of 
regular remittances and the chance for skills enhancement. For the receiving 
country, labour mobility schemes are seen as meeting labour shortages in 
developed economies, especially in labour intensive seasonal industries where 
employers may fi nd that a reliable workforce is lacking. The adoption of a 
seasonal labour scheme has been described by Australia’s Parliamentary 
Secretary for Pacifi c Island Affairs as “part of a comprehensive new approach 
to deepening our bilateral partnerships and strengthening our overall 
engagement with the region”;2 as adding symbolic value as a gesture of 
goodwill towards Australia’s Pacifi c neighbours;3 as having the potential to 
__________________
1 National Farmers’ Federation, 2008 Labour Shortage Action Plan (Canberra: National Farmers’ 
Federation, 2008).
2 D. Kerr, “Pacifi c Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme,” speech delivered at the Memorandum of 
Understanding Signing Ceremony, Canberra, 24 November 2008.
3 World Bank, Pacifi c Islands at Home and Away: Expanding Job Opportunities for Pacifi c Islanders 
through Labor Mobility (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006), p. 134.
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contribute to stability and security in the region;4 and as a powerful catalyst 
for regional integration.5 Whether these goals can be realized will be tested 
over time. The pilot program spans approximately three years from November 
2008 to June 2012, with a planned review after 18 months and 30 months of 
operation.
The potential for exploitation of workers engaged under temporary or 
guest worker schemes has been a concern internationally for many decades.6 
Proponents of seasonal worker schemes have acknowledged that they often 
involve compromises in which individual rights of workers are traded away 
for greater access to employment opportunities in developed countries.7 
Ultimately, it is a question of how best to secure the fundamental rights of 
seasonal workers while still meeting the needs of receiving countries.
In the case of Australia’s pilot scheme, local concerns have many dimensions 
and this has led to a dense web of government regulation designed to ensure 
that the scheme does not fail politically. First, there is a foreign relations 
dimension, which is directed towards improving Australia’s bilateral relations 
with its Pacifi c neighbours as part of the government’s new engagement with 
the Asia Pacifi c region. Second, there is a trade union dimension, which is 
directed towards accommodating the interests of labour organizations with 
which the Labor government has longstanding political ties. Although 
Australian trade unions have recently softened their approach to a seasonal 
worker scheme, they are still outspoken in their views that the scheme must 
not involve a lowering of workplace standards or any loss of jobs for Australian 
workers. Third, there is the need to meet public expectations by avoiding a 
repetition both of Australia’s nineteenth-century history of exploitation of 
Pacifi c labour and of the much more recent history of abuse and discrimination 
against temporary skilled migrants under what is commonly referred to as 
the “457 visa scheme.”
The fi rst part of this article examines the historical context of labour 
mobility in the Pacifi c, the framework of Australia’s seasonal worker pilot 
scheme, and the key features of its New Zealand progenitor, the Recognized 
Seasonal Employer program. The second part provides an overview of 
Australia’s recent experience of temporary skilled migration from the Asia 
Pacifi c region, which highlights the potential problems of exploitation and 
discrimination that can arise under temporary work programs and provides 
a cautionary tale for Australia’s pilot seasonal work scheme. The third part of 
the article examines the web of protective regulation that has been introduced 
__________________
4 Australian Senate, Perspectives on the Future of the Harvest Labour Force (Canberra: Standing 
Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and Education, 2006), p. 48.
5 AusAID, Pacifi c Economic Survey 09: Engaging with the World (Canberra: Australian Agency for 
International Development, 2009), p. 82.
6 M. Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programs: Policies, Adverse Consequences, and the Need to Make 
Them Work (Geneva: International Labour Offi ce), 2003.
7 World Bank, Pacifi c Islands at Home and Away, p.136.
Regulating Pacifi c Seasonal Labour in Australia
285
specifi cally to address seasonal migration from the Pacifi c. This includes 
intergovernmental agreements, close departmental oversight, use of local 
advisory bodies and a government insistence that Pacifi c labour is contracted 
through labour hire companies rather than directly by growers. The fourth 
part considers how the general regulatory framework of Australian industrial 
law and policy applies to seasonal workers and supplements the special 
arrangements. Critical factors are the comprehensive coverage of safety and 
equality issues, trade union involvement and the mechanisms available for 
resolving workplace disputes between Pacifi c workers and their employers, 
and between Pacifi c workers and their fellow workers. The article concludes 
by highlighting how these regulatory arrangements may affect the long-term 
viability of the scheme and its capacity to move beyond a pilot program to 
provide sustained opportunities for Pacifi c workers and local growers alike.
Pacifi c labour mobility
Movement of labour within the Pacifi c region is not a new phenomenon. 
The need for large pools of labour for plantations and mines during the 
colonial era led to signifi cant migration of workers within the region, 
particularly to the French and British territories of New Caledonia and Fiji.8 
Countries such as Nauru have historically drawn from their Pacifi c neighbours 
(especially Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands) to provide labour 
for the mining sector. Australia itself has a sorry history of forced removal 
of Pacifi c Islanders to work on farms in Queensland and New South Wales 
dating back to the nineteenth century, a practice that became known as 
“blackbirding.”9
However, since the early twentieth century the Melanesian countries of 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have had little access to 
labour opportunities on the Pacifi c Rim. By contrast, many Micronesian and 
Polynesian peoples have had opportunities to access jobs in developed 
economies in New Zealand, the United States and France because of special 
citizenship rights or preferential visa access for residents of current or former 
Pacifi c territories.10 Other ad hoc arrangements have also evolved over time, 
such as the practice of workers from Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu crewing on 
international shipping vessels of particular fl ag states.11
__________________
8 V. Naidu, “Modernisation and Development in the South Pacifi c,” in A. Jowitt and T. Newton 
Cain, ed., Passage of Change: Law, Society and Governance in the Pacifi c (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 
2003), pp. 16–17.
9 E. Docker, The Blackbirders: The Recruiting of South Seas Labour for Queensland 1863-1907 (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1970); J. MacClancy, To Kill a Bird with Two Stones: A Short History of Vanuatu 
(Port Vila: Vanuatu Cultural Centre, 2002), pp. 58–68.
10 B. Opeskin and T. MacDermott, “Resources, Population and Migration in the Pacifi c: 
Connecting Islands and Rim,” Asia Pacifi c Viewpoint, vol. 50, no. 3 (2009), pp. 363–367.
11 H. Ware, “Demography, Migration and Confl ict in the Pacifi c,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 
42 (2005), pp.435-454; J. Dennis, Pacifi c Island Seafarers: A Study of the Economic and Social Implications 
of Seafaring on Dependents. Suva: Secretariat of the Pacifi c Community, 2003, pp. 12-13.
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Over a sustained period, the Australian government resisted pressure to 
give preferential treatment to Pacifi c Islanders through a temporary work 
scheme, despite numerous recommendations that favoured trying out such 
a scheme.12 Part of this resistance was based on a claim that Australia’s 
immigration policy was strictly non-discriminatory with respect to country of 
origin and that immigration was “selective, skilled and tightly managed.”13 The 
exception was Australia’s neighbourly relationship with New Zealand, whose 
citizens enjoy special rights to enter and work in Australia under the 1973 
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangements. While Australia’s immigration policy may 
be non-discriminatory in terms of country of origin (expect for New Zealanders 
and those Pacifi c Islanders who are entitled to New Zealand citizenship), there 
is obviously discrimination on other grounds, such as age, family relations, 
health status, language ability, educational level and jobs skills.14
Australia’s historic preference for skilled migration has had a number of 
consequences. First, very few workers from Melanesia gain access to Australia 
under skilled migration schemes.15 Second, the opportunities that do exist 
for skilled migration, whether from Melanesia or elsewhere, have contributed 
to a Pacifi c “brain drain.”16 The reality is that those who most need jobs are 
unskilled workers with few opportunities for paid employment in the Pacifi c 
region and even fewer prospects of migrating to Pacifi c Rim countries. As 
Nic Maclellan has observed, many Pacifi c Island countries are “characterised 
by an oversupply of unskilled workers and an undersupply of skilled workers.”17 
Third, the emphasis on skilled migration has not supplied the reliable and 
regular workforce needed for seasonal work in the Australian horticulture 
industry because the defi ciencies in labour supply do not relate primarily to 
skilled or semi-skilled workers but to entry level positions of an unskilled or 
relatively low-skilled nature. As a result, the industry has had to rely on a 
mixture of documented and undocumented workers, backpackers on working 
holiday visas, and “grey nomads” (i.e., peripatetic retirees). Fourth, although 
Australia’s stated preference has been for permanent migration, recently 
there has been a large expansion of temporary long-stay business visas, known 
__________________
12 R. Jackson, Report of the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program (Canberra AGPS, 
1984); Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia’s Relations with 
Papua New Guinea and the Island States of the Southwest Pacifi c (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2003); 
AusAID, Core Group Recommendations Report for a White Paper on Australia’s Aid Program (Canberra: 
Australian Agency for International Development, 2005), p. 69.
13 A. Millbank, A Seasonal Guest-Worker Program for Australia? (Canberra: Australian Parliamentary 
Library, 2006), p. 2.
14 R. Appleyard and C. Stahl, South Pacifi c Migration: New Zealand Experience and Implications for 
Australia (Canberra: AusAID, 1995).
15 R. Bedford, E. Ho, V. Krishnan and B. Hong, “The Neighbourhood Effect: The Pacifi c in 
Aotearoa and Australia,” Asian and Pacifi c Migration Journal, vol. 16, no. 2 (2007), p. 265.
16 See, e.g., P. Brown and J. Connell, “The Migration of Doctors and Nurses from South Pacifi c 
Island Nations,” Social Science & Medicine, vol. 58 (2004), pp.2193-2210.
17 N. Maclellan, Workers for All Seasons? Issues from New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) 
Program (Melbourne: Swinburne Institute for Social Research, 2008), p. 11.
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as “457 visas,” which do not facilitate permanent migration. Presumably, 
considerations other than skill and permanency could inform migration 
policy in this area, including outward-looking factors such as enhancing 
development assistance and promoting regional stability.18
In contrast to Australia, New Zealand has had an active engagement over 
many decades with Pacifi c workers from its current and former territories. 
New Zealand has taken an approach that acknowledges its “special 
relationship” with Pacific Island countries, especially in Polynesia. In 
recognition of these strong historical ties, residents of Cook Islands, Niue 
and Tokelau are New Zealand citizens and are therefore able to pursue 
employment opportunities in New Zealand.19 Since the 1960s there has been 
a special Samoan quota system that currently allows up to 1,100 Samoan 
citizens to be granted residence in New Zealand each year.20 In 2002 New 
Zealand added a further dimension to these arrangements with a new visa 
class—the Pacifi c Access Category—which provides additional migration 
opportunities through random balloting for residents of other Pacifi c Island 
countries with which New Zealand has close cultural or historical ties.21 Some 
of these arrangements have consequences for Australia because Pacifi c 
Islanders who have New Zealand citizenship can enter and work in Australia 
under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangements. New Zealand has also had a 
number of programs, dating back to the 1970s, to grant permits to low-skilled 
workers to pursue temporary employment in the agriculture and forestry 
industries. Much of this work was undertaken by Samoans, Tongans and 
Fijians. New Zealand’s new seasonal worker scheme, announced at the Pacifi c 
Islands Forum Secretariat meeting in Fiji in October 2006, is designed as a 
single policy framework, and other programs such as the work permit schemes 
are to be phased out over time.22
Australia’s Pacifi c Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme
The Pacifi c Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme makes provision for up to 2,500 
Pacifi c Islanders to work in the Australian horticulture industry over a three-
year period for up to seven months in a year. Since the scheme was announced 
in August 2008, bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) have been 
signed between Australia and Vanuatu, Tonga and Kiribati, and an agreement 
with Papua New Guinea has been concluded and is expected to be signed 
in the near future. The scheme targets up to 800 workers from Vanuatu, 800 
__________________
18 Appleyard and Stahl, South Pacifi c Migration, pp. 9–10.
19 Citizenship Act 1977 (NZ) s.6, Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s.18.
20 This scheme has been attributed to “the spirit of close friendship embodied in the 1962 Treaty 
of Friendship between New Zealand and Samoa,” New Zealand Department of Labour, Migration 
Trends 2006/07 (Wellington: Department of Labour, 2008), p. 86.
21 The annual quota of 400 places is currently allocated between Tonga (250), Tuvalu (75), and 
Kiribati (75). The participation of Fiji Islands was suspended following the 2006 coup.
22 Bedford et al, “The Neighbourhood Effect,” pp. 260–261.
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from Tonga, 250 from Kiribati, and 650 from Papua New Guinea. The fi rst 
phase of the pilot was to recruit up to 100 seasonal workers, but in fact only 
56 arrived in Australia to work—50 Tongans and 6 ni-Vanuatu. The second 
phase is to recruit the remaining 2,444 workers.
Two regional areas were initially selected for the pilot scheme: the Swan 
Hill–Robinvale region in Victoria and the Griffi th region in New South Wales. 
Other regions are now being considered where there is a demonstrated 
unmet demand for labour and a suffi ciently long harvest season to warrant 
participation in the scheme.
The scheme is premised on the existence of unmet labour demand in the 
Australian horticulture industry. Approval for growers to participate in the 
scheme depends on their ability to show they have tested the local labour 
market and taken reasonable steps to recruit Australian nationals. Oversight 
of the scheme is vested in local advisory bodies established for each 
geographical region. Horticultural growers in the designated regions apply 
to their local advisory body for access to seasonal workers, indicating the 
number of workers required, the period of available work and the desired 
skills and attributes of workers. Approval for growers to participate in the 
scheme is dependent on their willingness to participate in other labour 
market programs to assist in the placement of disadvantaged workers, 
including income support recipients, Indigenous Australians and 
humanitarian job seekers.23 Once a grower has obtained approval, he does 
not contract directly with Pacifi c workers but instead negotiates with the 
labour hire company that has been appointed to manage the recruitment 
and placement of workers for the region. A signifi cant feature of the scheme 
is that the labour hire company is the employer of the workers, a factor 
discussed further below. To be selected for the scheme, labour hire companies 
must demonstrate a solid history of workplace compliance and established 
human resources polices and procedures.
The New Zealand model
New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme (the RSE scheme) 
provides for up to 8,000 workers annually to be engaged planting, 
maintaining, harvesting and packing crops in the horticulture and viticulture 
industries for up to seven months in a year. The local labour market must 
be tested before turning to recruitment from the Pacifi c region and South 
East Asia. In order to achieve recognized status under the scheme, an 
employer is subject to a vetting process that looks at past workplace practices, 
evidence of written employment policies and procedures and the facilities 
available for the workers. Once recognized, an employer can seek an 
__________________
23 P. Mares, “Objections to Pacifi c Seasonal Work Programs in Rural Australia,” Public Policy, vol. 
2, no. 1 (2007), p. 73.
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“agreement to recruit” overseas workers, setting out the number of workers 
required, their roles and the duration of employment. The scheme initially 
involved a number of trial countries (Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu), with a view to recruiting labour from all Pacifi c Islands Forum 
countries if the scheme were successful.24 To date, the largest number of 
workers has come from Vanuatu. Under the RSE scheme, an employer is 
obliged to meet half the travel costs of the Pacifi c workers, guarantee a 
minimum number of hours of work, and arrange various aspects of pastoral 
care, including accommodation, transport, recreation and the opportunity 
for religious observance. A visa to undertake this work is dependent on 
having a job offer from an RSE registered employer and the worker passing 
various health and character tests.
The New Zealand scheme has been in operation since April 2007, offering 
Australia the opportunity to review its neighbour’s experience and fi ne tune 
its own scheme. The New Zealand Department of Labour has described the 
scheme as “on track to achieve its aims,” while acknowledging that issues 
have arisen in its early stages regarding pay and deductions, cost and quality 
of accommodation, hours of work and productivity, and induction and 
training.25 An independent study of the operation of the New Zealand scheme, 
funded by the Australian Research Council, identifi ed a number of areas of 
disputation, including housing, consistency of available work, payment rates 
and deductions. The study suggested that seasonal work programs “require 
investment and interventions outside the straight employer/employee 
relationship” and found there was a need for greater engagement with trade 
unions, the community sector and Pacifi c communities, particularly regarding 
pastoral care and support services for workers and their home communities.26 
In June 2009 the New Zealand Government foreshadowed changes to the 
system of pay deductions, which have generated some controversy. Research 
on the selection of workers from Tonga for the RSE scheme indicates that 
the program is targeting comparatively poor and unskilled workers with 
restricted incomes and schooling, thereby creating opportunities that would 
not otherwise exist for these workers.27
Temporary skilled migrants: A cautionary tale
Australia has another temporary migration program relevant to the Asia 
Pacifi c region, which provides a cautionary tale about the potential for 
__________________
24 The Pacifi c Islands Forum has 16 full members, including Australia and New Zealand.
25 New Zealand Department of Labour, Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Policy: Stakeholder Update 
(Wellington: Department of Labour, 2008).
26 Maclellan, Workers for All Seasons, pp. 6, 31.
27 J. Gibson, D. McKenzie, and H. Rohorua, “How Pro-Poor Is the Selection of Seasonal Migrant 
Workers from Tonga under New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer Program?,” Pacifi c Economic 
Bulletin, vol. 23, no. 3 (2008), pp.187-204.
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exploitation and discrimination in temporary work schemes. In 1996 a new 
class of visa, commonly known as the “457 visa” was introduced to allow for 
employer-sponsored migration of skilled workers to Australia for up to four 
years. Like the Pacifi c seasonal worker scheme, its object was to meet 
temporary labour shortages, which became more acute as the Australian 
resource boom took off after 2002. The program expanded from an annual 
intake of around 16,500 workers in 1997–1998 to nearly 60,000 workers in 
2007–2008, plus their dependants. The cumulative effect of the annual intake 
has been signifi cant: by 31 December 2008 there were 132,023 such workers 
in Australia. Of the 40 percent from the Asia Pacifi c region, the most populous 
national groups were Indians (13,167), Filipinos (11,587) and mainland 
Chinese (8,902). The number of skilled migrants from the Pacifi c is small 
relative to other national groups (931 Papua New Guineans, 917 Fijians and 
175 “others”) but still signifi cant relative to the 2,500 potential Pacifi c workers 
under the seasonal worker scheme.28
The increase in 457 visa migration, and its gradual expansion from skilled 
to semi-skilled workers in trades, mining and manufacturing, has been 
accompanied by an increasing number of reports of poor working conditions, 
workplace discrimination and exploitation.29 The Australian Manufacturing 
Workers’ Union (AMWU) campaigned actively against the program, 
describing it as “a new form of indentured servitude” and decrying that 
“temporary visas are being misused by…unscrupulous employers to provide 
a source of cheap, bonded labour.”30
Sustained criticisms of the 457 visa program led to a number of internal 
and external reviews.31 In one of these reviews, Commissioner Deegan 
documented allegations of mistreatment of migrant workers under the 
scheme, including not being paid overtime, working longer hours than non-
visa employees, limited access to sick leave, dismissal for taking sick leave, 
dismissal because of pregnancy, dismissal for taking leave to care for a sick 
spouse or child, overcharges on rent or other expenses organized by the 
employer and sexual harassment in the workplace.32 In addition, several 
employers of 457 workers have been prosecuted successfully under industrial 
laws for failing to provide workers with required information about the terms 
__________________
28 Australian Government, Immigration Update July to December 2008 (Canberra: Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, 2009), pp. 47–48.
29 M. Bissett and I. Landau, “Australia’s 457 Visa Scheme and the Rights of Migrant Workers,” 
Alternative Law Journal, vol. 33, no. 3 (2008), pp.142-146.
30 Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union, Temporary Skilled Migration: A New Form of Indentured 
Servitude (Melbourne: AMWU, 2006).
31 Australian Government, Discussion Paper: Business (Long Stay) Subclass 457 and Related Temporary 
Visa Reforms (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2008); Visa Subclass 457 External 
Reference Group, Final Report to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Canberra: Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, 2008); B. Deegan, Visa Subclass 457 Integrity Review: Final Report (Canberra: 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2008).
32 Deegan, Visa Subclass 457 Integrity Review, p. 6.
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of their employment agreement, for pressuring workers to sign an employment 
agreement and for breaching occupational health and safety laws.33
The problems that have been exposed in the 457 visa program are a telling 
reminder of the vulnerability of foreign workers in temporary employment 
schemes. Proposed government reforms have now sought to address some 
of the most pressing concerns by increasing wages for foreign workers so 
that local wages and conditions are not undermined, increasing the minimum 
language requirement, requiring employers to demonstrate a record of 
non-discriminatory employment practices and enhancing formal monitoring 
and compliance. The Pacifi c seasonal worker pilot scheme stands to gain 
signifi cantly from the experience of the 457 visa program, and we now turn 
to consider how Pacifi c workers are protected under the pilot scheme.
Special regulatory protections for seasonal workers
The fairness of temporary labour schemes is often a highly contested issue. 
For example, the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, which 
has been operating for the past four decades and draws agriculture workers 
from the Caribbean and Mexico, has been described by some as a “reasonable 
model” that provides “useful lessons for Australia,”34 while others have called 
it Canada’s “shameful little secret.”35 Central to any assessment of the 
Australian scheme is the extent to which measures have been set in place to 
minimize the prospect of exploitation of Pacifi c workers.
In its 2006 report on enhancing labour mobility in the Pacifi c, the World 
Bank identifi ed a broad range of protections that are essential to temporary 
work schemes.36 Some of these are based on broad principles of equality and 
non-discrimination, such as entitlements to pay equality with local workers; 
others recognize fundamental labour standards such as freedom of 
association. A temporary labour scheme can offer signifi cant protections for 
workers if parameters are set to guarantee minimum length of stay, minimum 
hours of work, sharing of costs and reasonable deductions. Dispute resolution 
mechanisms that make provision for the fair handling complaints and 
sanctions for non-compliance, are also relevant. A factor that has a signifi cant 
bearing on whether a scheme can ensure fair outcomes is whether workers 
are bonded to a particular employer in circumstances where the threat of 
expulsion can be used as a tool of coercion and exploitation.
One benchmark against which temporary labour mobility schemes can 
be measured is the extent to which they adhere to the norms established in 
__________________
33 See, e.g., Federal Court of Australia, Hanssen Pty Ltd v Jones, [2009] FCA 192 (4 March 
2009).
34 World Bank, Pacifi c Islands at Home and Away, p. 117.
35 United Food and Commercial Workers Canada, National Report: Status of Migrant Farm Workers 
in Canada (Toronto: UFCW Canada, 2002), p. 21.
36 World Bank, Pacifi c Islands at Home and Away, p. 137.
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international instruments relevant to the treatment of migrant workers.37 
The International Labour Organization has concluded two treaties dealing 
specifi cally with migrant labour, but Australia is not party to either of them.38 
More recently, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a comprehensive 
convention on migrant workers, which came into force in 2003, but 
Australia—keeping company with nearly all net migrant receiving states—is 
not party to that instrument either.39 Australia’s failure to ratify these 
conventions does not mean that it fails to observe the conventions’ core 
principles in practice, yet ratifi cation would no doubt provide a measure of 
comfort to Pacifi c Island countries by signalling that their nationals are 
entitled to an international minimum standard of treatment when working 
in Australia.
In the absence of guarantees under international law, alternative 
protections have been put in place to minimize the risk of exploitation of 
seasonal workers, and it is to these that we now turn. The interrelationships 
between relevant actors are illustrated in fi gure 1.
__________________
37 R. Cholewinski, “The Rights of Migrant Workers,” in R. Cholewinski, R. Perruchoud, and E. 
MacDonald, ed., International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges (The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2007).
38 Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (ILO No. 97), adopted in 1949, and the 
Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of 
Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO No.143), adopted in 1975.
39 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families 1990.
Figure 1
Organizational Relationships between Key Actors
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Intergovernmental agreements
The bilateral agreements that have been entered into between Australia and 
participating Pacifi c Island countries are an important source of protective 
measures for seasonal workers. As noted above, Australia has entered into 
MOUs with three Pacifi c Island countries—Kiribati, Tonga and Vanuatu—and 
an agreement with Papua New Guinea is still to be signed. The MOUs set out 
the operational principles governing the scheme, the desired outcomes and 
critical factors by which the effectiveness of the scheme will be evaluated.
The protection of Pacifi c workers is recognized under each of these 
themes. For example, the operational principles include “equity of access 
and opportunity for workers” and “investing maximum effort to mitigate 
risk to … participating nationals.” The desired outcomes include “avoiding 
unethical recruitment practices [or] exploitation of workers.” And the critical 
success factors will gauge the scheme’s effectiveness by whether “[Pacifi c] 
nationals enjoy…fair and reasonable treatment by approved Australian 
employers” and whether seasonal workers “are not levied with any recruitment 
costs or subject to excessive up-front charges”.40
The worker protections identifi ed in the MOUs are important because 
they state the common understanding of the parties at the commencement 
of the scheme, but they suffer from several limitations. They do not cover 
the broad spectrum of rights and obligations that are found in comprehensive 
international instruments. They do not create binding legal obligations 
between states: as instruments of “less than treaty status,” they operate only 
in the moral and political spheres. Moreover, their language is very general, 
leaving open both the possibility of different interpretations and the necessity 
of further arrangements to make the principles operational.
The MOUs are supported by detailed “facilitative arrangements” which 
purportedly deal with issues of recruitment, pre-departure and on-arrival 
information, the role of trade unions, pastoral support in Australia and access 
to training. It is likely that these arrangements articulate protections for 
Pacifi c workers beyond those stipulated in the MOUs. However, the details 
of the facilitative arrangements have not been released into the public domain 
because they are regarded as “private arrangements” 41 and, presumably, 
because different concessions have been negotiated with each country.
Departmental oversight
The pilot scheme is unusual for the high degree of government oversight 
of what would otherwise be private employment arrangements. Two 
__________________
40 See, e.g., Australian Government, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian 
Government and the Government of the Republic of Vanuatu in Support of Australia’s Pacifi c Seasonal 
Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS)” (Canberra: Australian Department of Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations, 2008).
41 Personal correspondence with DEEWR, 28 July 2009.
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departments are closely involved in supervising operational aspects of the 
scheme. The lead department is the Department of Education, Employment 
and Workplace Relations (DEEWR), which exercises functions in two main 
areas. In relation to growers, DEEWR receives applications from growers 
who wish to access Pacifi c workers; it assesses whether they have made genuine 
attempts to recruit local Australian labour; and it conducts integrity checks 
about their immigration, workplace relations and occupational health and 
safety history. In relation to labour hire companies, DEEWR receives and 
evaluates expressions of interest from companies that wish to employ Pacifi c 
workers, and it scrutinizes each company’s fi nancial viability and its history 
of workplace practices. Successful applicants must enter into a detailed “deed 
of agreement” with DEEWR, which sets out their obligations under the 
program, including monitoring and reporting requirements.
The other department involved in the scheme is the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), which oversees the issuing of 
immigration visas. Each selected labour hire company is required to enter 
into “special program agreement” with DIAC and it is then able to enter 
into commercial arrangements with growers to host the Pacifi c workers for 
all or part of their stay in Australia. The special program agreement sets out 
the obligations of the labour hire company but these extend far beyond 
migration-related matters, indeed it forms an integral part of the special 
regulatory framework for administering the scheme. Among the most 
important obligations, a labour hire company is required to (a) pay the full 
upfront cost of each worker’s airfares, with the ability to recoup half the 
cost from the worker over the period of employment; (b) meet all transport 
costs of the Pacifi c workers between the arrival and departure point and the 
location of the work; (c) guarantee Pacifi c workers a minimum average of 
30 hours work per week for six months; (d) provide briefi ngs and appropriate 
induction and training; (e) provide pastoral care and assist workers with 
arranging accommodation, health care and banking facilities; and 
(f) communicate in writing if any fi nancial deductions are to be made for 
airfares, advances for living expenses or accommodation. Labour hire 
companies are also required to reimburse the government up to AUD$10,000 
for any costs incurred by the government in trying to locate and remove a 
seasonal worker who overstays his or her visa. This institutional incentive to 
promote visa compliance is supported by the prohibition on seasonal workers 
bringing dependants to Australia and by the opportunity for circular 
migration in which visa-compliant workers can obtain work in future harvest 
seasons.42
__________________
42 Australian Government, “Factsheet: What Will the Australian Government Do to Prevent 
Overstaying by Pacifi c Seasonal Workers?” (Canberra: Department of Education Employment and 
Workplace Relations, 2009).
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Local advisory bodies
A third level of regulatory control comes from the establishment of local 
advisory bodies in each of the geographic regions in which Pacifi c workers 
undertake work for growers. These bodies comprise six members—two 
representatives from local employers in the horticulture industry, one from 
local government, one from a trade union and two from community 
organizations, including churches. Each local advisory body is supported by 
government representatives from DEEWR and DIAC who observe and assist 
in deliberations. The bodies serve a number of functions. They provide 
advice to DEEWR on local conditions and on applications by local growers 
to participate in the scheme. They also consult about the role of labour hire 
companies in each region and liaise with labour hire companies appointed 
to manage the recruitment and placement of Pacifi c seasonal workers in the 
region. Local advisory bodies can also play a part in facilitating and 
monitoring pastoral care for workers, but it is clear that labour hire companies 
will have to take a broader view of their role as employers than may have 
been typical in the past.
Labour hire arrangements
The pilot seasonal worker scheme makes it very clear that Pacifi c workers 
will be employed only by labour hire companies and not directly by growers. 
During the fi rst phase of the arrangements, a number of labour hire 
companies were approved to employ and place a small number of Pacifi c 
workers; initially one engaged Tongan workers in the Swan Hill–Robinvale 
region and another engaged ni-Vanuatu workers in the Griffi th region. 
Additional labour hire companies have now been selected for the second 
phase of the scheme.
Labour hire arrangements are not new to the Australian labour market, 
where they have been used to achieve fl exibility in a number of industries 
for many years.43 This has also been the case in the horticulture industry, 
where growers meet their seasonal demand for labour by supplementing 
their own employees with workers contracted through labour hire companies. 
What differs about the arrangements under the pilot scheme is that the nature 
of the employment arrangements is not left to the discretion of growers but 
is dictated by government as a regulatory condition of participation in the 
scheme.
The Australian government has suggested a number of reasons for 
designating labour hire companies rather than growers as the employers. It 
removes fi nancial risk from growers and simplifi es the negotiation of 
__________________
43 Productivity Commission, The Role of Non-Traditional Work in the Australian Labour Market 
(Canberra: Australian Government, 2006).
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industrial instruments; it assists government in monitoring wages and 
conditions and in overseeing the practices of employers; and it facilitates 
the regulation of employers through codes of conduct applicable to the 
labour hire industry. The importance of the last point is demonstrated by 
the criteria that DEEWR uses to select labour hire companies. One criterion 
is that the applicant “is a member of the Recruitment and Consulting Services 
Association Ltd (RCSA) or another Australian peak recruitment body or [is] 
willing to comply with the RCSA Code of Conduct or similar industry 
standard.” Thus the government’s regulatory framework for the pilot scheme 
includes the potential to require compliance with industry self-regulation.
In other contexts, the trilateral work relationships established by the 
involvement of labour hire companies have been problematic because of 
the mixed legal relationships between the parties.44 In the pilot scheme the 
labour hire company is clearly designated as the employer and, like most 
labour hire arrangements, there is no contract of employment between the 
grower and the worker (see fi gure 1). This avoids a common problem 
associated with temporary work schemes, namely, that the worker is tied to 
a single host and is therefore vulnerable to exploitation under the threat of 
being sent home. Under the Australian scheme, the tying is not to a single 
grower but to a single labour hire company. This can also create diffi culties 
where workers have a dispute about their treatment at the hands of the 
labour hire company or where the company has diffi culty maintaining an 
adequate supply of work. Moreover, there may be problems if workers have 
a dispute with a grower, since the labour hire company may be reluctant to 
disrupt its commercial relations with the grower by intervening on the 
workers’ behalf.
General workplace regulation and its application to seasonal workers
One of the critical failures of Australia’s 457 visa scheme was that temporary 
migrants were exempted from the industrial regulation governing wages and 
conditions of Australian workers. As discussed above, this left migrant workers 
exposed to the risk of discrimination and exploitation, and for some migrants 
this risk became a reality. This design failure has now been remedied and 
has not been repeated under the seasonal worker pilot scheme. This part 
considers how the general regulatory framework of Australian industrial law, 
policy and process applies to seasonal workers and therefore supplements 
the special arrangements considered above.
How will workplace regulation in Australia respond to the challenges 
posed by a seasonal worker scheme? The pilot scheme is premised on the 
assumption that the scheme should not involve any lowering of workplace 
__________________
44 R. Owens and J. Riley, The Law of Work (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
pp. 150–154.
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standards or any loss of jobs for Australian workers. Trade unions have 
historically opposed such schemes on the basis that they are “exploitative of 
the guest and exploitative of unemployed Australians.”45 Although there has 
been a softening of opposition to a seasonal worker scheme by some sectors 
of the trade union movement, their principal concerns of not undermining 
jobs and wages remain.
Recent reforms
The last decade has seen a fundamental realignment of Australia’s collective 
framework of workplace relations to a very different model of labour 
regulation. Australia’s traditional model of industrial relations relied heavily 
on centralized bargaining and arbitrated awards but from the early 1990s 
successive Australian governments—both liberal and conservative—began 
to allow for greater fl exibility and enterprise-level bargaining. The changes 
introduced by the conservative Howard government in 2005 by the Work 
Choices legislation represented the high water mark of efforts to achieve a 
decentralized industrial relations system.46 These reforms “all but completely 
dismantled the traditional Australian labour law system”47 and put in place 
a new regime characterized by a very limited safety net, little scope for 
arbitration, an emphasis on individual rather than collective agreements, 
weakened enforcement mechanisms and marginalization of collective 
values.48
Australian workplace regulation is now at another critical juncture, with 
a different Australian government seeking to redress what it perceives as the 
imbalance of reforms instituted since the early 1990s, under a policy called 
Forward with Fairness.49 The fi rst piece of legislation to implement this policy 
took effect in March 2008.50 It brought to an end the use of statutory 
individual agreements and set up an ongoing process of award modernization. 
The next phase of the reform agenda, the Fair Work Act (2009), claims to 
rebalance Australian workplace relations towards fairer outcomes.51 Most of 
the new legislative scheme came into force on 1 July 2009, although aspects 
of the scheme such as award modernization were postponed until 1 January 
2010.
__________________
45 Australian Workers’ Union, Inquiry into Pacifi c Regional Seasonal Contract Labour: Submission to 
Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education References Committee (Melbourne: AWU, 2006), 
p. 4.
46 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth). 
47 Owens and Riley, The Law of Work, p. 78.
48 J. Riley and P. Sheldon, eds., Remaking Australian Industrial Relations (Sydney: CCH Australia 
Ltd, 2008), pp. xix-xx, 5, 21-24, 35-36.
49 Australian Labor Party, ALP National Platform and Constitution 2007 (Canberra: ALP National 
Conference, 2007).
50 Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (Cth). 
51 A. Stewart, “A Question of Balance: Labor’s New Vision for Workplace Regulation,” Australian 
Journal of Labour Law, vol. 22 (2009), pp.3-50.
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These changes form the backdrop against which the seasonal worker 
scheme will be assessed. Although some Pacifi c workers arrived in Australia 
during the fi nal days of the previous workplace relations regime, the vast 
majority will work under the new regime. The new industrial relations climate 
has the potential to provide Pacifi c workers with a more favourable working 
environment than previous regimes. The new parameters of workplace 
regulation are likely to restore a greater collective focus to workplace 
regulation and to offer more safeguards through the incorporation of a 
broader industrial safety net. The expanded safety net, in the form of National 
Employment Standards together with the reduced capacity to rely on statutory 
individual contracts, are likely to offer greater protections to vulnerable 
employees.
Awards and agreements
Horticulture and agriculture have been described as precarious industries 
involving low union coverage, limited government regulation and a highly 
casualized, mobile workforce.52 These factors present particular challenges 
in providing industrial protection for workers. The terms and conditions for 
workers in this industry are governed by a complex regulatory framework 
comprised of a number of sources. First, there are awards negotiated for 
particular industries. A modernized award—the Horticulture Award 2010—has 
been prepared for the horticulture industry and commenced operation in 
2010. Second, the new National Employment Standards set out minimum 
legislative entitlements on matters such as working hours and leave. Third, 
some employers have contractual arrangements with their workers to pay 
above the award rates to refl ect market conditions. And fi nally, some 
employers negotiate a collective agreement applicable to their workforce 
alone but these are not widespread.
Early briefi ngs by the Australian government indicated that one of the 
responsibilities of labour hire companies would be to negotiate an appropriate 
industrial instrument to cover the terms and conditions of seasonal workers. 
The Australian Workers Union (AWU), which covers many workers in this 
industry, put forward a framework agreement outlining the terms and 
conditions of employment under the scheme, including matters such as 
deductions and remittances. At this stage, it is unknown to what extent 
individual labour hire companies will base their arrangements on the 
framework agreement.
The application of different industrial instruments to the work undertaken 
by Pacifi c seasonal workers can be illustrated by the example of the 50 Tongan 
workers who arrived in Australia in February 2009. They were initially engaged 
__________________
52 N. Maclellan, “Seasonal Workers for Australia: Lessons from New Zealand,” Farm Policy Journal, 
vol. 5, no. 3 (2008), pp. 47–48.
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to pick almonds in the Robinvale region in Victoria and were employed by 
a labour hire company called Tree Minders. There was confl ict from the 
start between the labour hire company and the relevant trade union, the 
AWU. Tree Minders chose not use the AWU’s framework agreement—relying 
instead on minimum entitlements in the horticulture award—and it 
employed the workers as casuals rather than as permanent employees for 
the duration of their stay in Australia. These arrangements put in jeopardy 
a fundamental aspect of the scheme, namely, that the workers would be 
guaranteed 30 hours work per week for six months. The diffi culties came to 
a head with the collapse of the company (Timbercorp) that owned the farms 
on which the work was being done. This left the labour hire company without 
adequate work for the Tongan workers.
Ultimately, the Tongan workers were re-employed by a different labour 
hire company and were split into two groups for the remainder of their visa 
period. Some workers were relocated to Queensland to work on the citrus 
harvest. A smaller group remained in Victoria pruning table grapes. The 
AWU became involved in negotiations on behalf of the workers, who were 
then employed under terms and conditions consistent with the framework 
agreement. The six ni-Vanuatu workers employed in the Griffi th region were 
employed under the framework agreement from the outset, and their status 
was that of permanent employees.
The diffi culties experienced so early in Australia’s pilot scheme highlight 
some of the challenges of using labour hire companies as intermediaries. 
Under their special program agreement with DIAC, labour hire companies 
undertake to provide each worker with an average of at least 30 hours work 
per week for six months, although the demand for seasonal labour is 
ultimately within the control not of labour hire companies but of growers. 
In New Zealand these diffi culties have been largely avoided by direct 
employment arrangements between Pacifi c workers and growers.
Occupational health and safety
A fundamental obligation of an employer, both under statute and the 
common law, is to provide a safe and healthy place of work for its employees 
and contractors. The employer is responsible for ensuring the safety of the 
worksite, the work systems in place, and the storage and handling of potentially 
harmful materials. This obligation requires employers to undertake hazard 
identifi cation and risk assessments to ensure all steps are taken to prevent 
and control risks to the health and safety of their workers. This extends to 
providing adequate information, instruction, training and supervision of 
workers, as well as consulting with workers about occupational health and 
safety (OHS) issues. For Pacifi c seasonal workers, these core obligations are 
replicated under the terms of the special program agreement.
Obligations under Australian OHS laws attach not only to an employment 
relationship but to entities engaged in labour hire arrangements, including 
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the labour hire company that employs the labour and the host to whom the 
services of the worker are provided. Thus, both the grower and the labour 
hire company must proactively manage risks to the health and safety of Pacifi c 
workers who are engaged at the work site and ensure that appropriate actions 
are taken to avoid risks to health and safety.53 Growers have an obligation to 
ensure all reasonable steps are taken to prevent workers being exposed to 
risks to their health or safety while working at a grower’s site.54 Additionally, 
labour hire companies, as employers, have an obligation to assess the 
workplace for risks before placing the workers, to examine the growers’ OHS 
policies and procedures, to make their workers aware of OHS procedures 
and hazards at the site and to provide on-site training.55
Effective communication is a key factor in controlling risks to health and 
safety. The ILO has noted that “language and cultural barriers require specifi c 
OHS communication, instruction and training approaches.”56 Pacifi c seasonal 
workers are likely to be unfamiliar with many of the practices used in 
Australian horticulture, to be inexperienced in the use of chemicals employed 
in intensive farming and to have different (and probably lower) expectations 
about health and safety standards. It may be questioned whether many of 
the workers have suffi cient knowledge of safety standards, at least on their 
fi rst placing, to enable them to resist working in conditions that may be 
judged unsafe. Although profi ciency in English is a desired attribute for 
participating in the scheme, for many Pacifi c workers English is a second or 
third language and may not be at a level suffi cient to understand instructions, 
read signage or labelling and communicate effectively in the workplace to 
avoid health and safety risks.
It is also foreseeable that many seasonal workers will be keen to work long 
hours to maximize the fi nancial return from their temporary stay, even when 
they may have an injury or are susceptible to a repetitive use injury. The 
extent to which adequate medical screening is done before departure will 
have an impact in this area. In Victoria there is a statutory obligation to 
provide information in an appropriate language, and an OHS Compliance Code 
provides guidance on these issues.57 Vigilance in supervision will also play a 
part in ensuring the heath and safety of seasonal workers, as will the role of 
trade unions in ensuring compliance with health and safety standards. 
__________________
53 R. Johnstone and M. Quinlan, “The OHS Regulatory Challenges Posed by Agency Workers: 
Evidence from Australia,” Employee Relations, vol. 28, no. 3 (2006), pp. 273-289.
54 Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) ss 23–24; Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 
(NSW) ss 8(2), 9(1).
55 Johnstone and Quinlan, “OHS Regulatory Challenges,” p. 282.
56 International Labour Organization, Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy. 
Geneva: International Labour Offi ce, 2004, para.153.
57 Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) s 22(1)(c); Worksafe Victoria, Compliance Code: 
Communicating Occupational Health and Safety across Languages (Melbourne: Worksafe Victoria, 2008).
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Exploitation and discrimination
The potential for exploitation of seasonal workers has been one of the 
principal objections to such schemes for some time. The lack of social and 
cultural support networks for temporary workers, the absence of long-term 
job security and the prospect of being sent home arbitrarily all operate to 
place temporary workers in a vulnerable position. In minimizing the risk of 
exploitation and discrimination, Australia has the capacity to learn vital 
lessons from its experience with 457 visas under the temporary skilled 
migration program discussed above.
Both labour hire companies as employers, and growers as hosts, have a 
statutory obligation to ensure all reasonable steps are taken to prevent and 
eliminate discrimination and harassment in the workplace. How should these 
obligations be realized in practice? This requires a proactive approach to 
minimize the risk of discrimination and harassment in advance of placing 
workers. The required preparatory work extends to providing workers with 
information on workplace rights during pre-departure and on-arrival 
processes. It also extends to ensuring that equal employment opportunity 
policies and procedures are in place at the workplace, that existing work 
practices are non-discriminatory in their application to Pacifi c workers and 
that growers receive training to create a non-discriminatory environment. 
Ultimately, the knowledge that seasonal workers have about avenues for redress 
and the access they have to effective dispute resolution processes will have a 
signifi cant impact on the potential for exploitation and discrimination.
Trade union involvement
We have already noted that trade unions in Australia historically have been 
“absolutely opposed to guest labour schemes.”58 This position has now shifted, 
with some Australian unions accepting that a temporary labour scheme can 
be of mutual benefi t to primary industries and to neighbouring Pacifi c states, 
provided it does not involve any lowering of employment standards and 
conditions. Part of this shift may be attributed to the fact that labour shortages 
in these industries forced growers to rely increasingly on an undocumented 
workforce comprising a mixture of overseas students working beyond their 
visas, individuals working while in receipt of Australian social security benefi ts 
and those with no visa entitlement to work.59 There is no guarantee that 
labour supplied through these channels will enjoy terms and conditions of 
employment that comport with existing labour standards, and it was thus in 
__________________
58 Australian Council of Trade Unions, ACTU’s Submission to the Senate Employment, Workplace 
Relations and Education Committee Enquiry into Pacifi c Region Seasonal Contract Labour (Melbourne: ACTU, 
2006).
59 Australian Workers’ Union, Submission to Senate Inquiry, pp. 7–8.
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the interests of trade unions to ensure that labour shortages were met through 
more formal and regulated channels.
Trade unions have an interest in ensuring that the wages and conditions 
of Pacifi c workers meet the minimum standards set in the relevant industrial 
instruments. The ability of trade unions to access workplaces to speak to 
workers about their working conditions will be important to the proper 
oversight of the seasonal worker scheme. Rights of entry have been a 
contentious aspect of previous workplace reform agendas.60 The changes 
introduced by the Fair Work Act 2009 allow for more liberal rights of entry, 
and a change of some signifi cance in the context of seasonal workers is that 
trade unions will have access to a workplace for the purpose of discussions 
even if they currently have no members there. Trade unions also have specifi c 
rights of entry to investigate alleged breaches of OHS laws.
Resolving disputes and monitoring compliance
Seasonal worker schemes need robust processes for dealing with workplace 
disputes, particularly if Pacifi c workers feel vulnerable to being sent home 
if they make complaints or if cultural differences in the articulation and 
settlement of grievances make them reticent about voicing their concerns 
through formal channels.61 Concerned about these issues, some Pacifi c 
communities have chosen their initial participants for their good 
communication skills so that they may speak on behalf of other workers and 
help to resolve any diffi culties.
There are established procedures for dealing with disputes that arise in 
relation to employment issues. All awards and collective agreements must 
contain a dispute settlement clause, and they must make provision for the 
use of informal procedures to resolve grievances about entitlements.62 Where 
disputes arise regarding provisions in an award or agreement, or with respect 
to other work conditions, seasonal workers may use these dispute resolution 
processes directly or a trade union may act on their behalf.
As with any regulatory scheme, effective compliance and enforcement 
relies on the willingness of informed individuals to come forward with 
grievances. Because many Pacifi c workers lack knowledge of Australian 
workplace practices, it is incumbent on government agencies to be proactive 
in seeking out seasonal workers to ascertain whether the scheme is functioning 
well in practice. Workplace inspectors have the power to enter workplaces 
to ascertain if rights and obligations under laws, agreements, awards or orders 
__________________
60 I. Ross and J. Trew, Bargaining under Work Choices (Sydney: Butterworths, 2006), ch.8.
61 G. Hassall, “Alternative Dispute Resolution in Pacifi c Island Countries,” Journal of South Pacifi c 
Law, vol. 9, no. 2 (2005)  available online at http://www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL.
62 J. Riley and T. Sarina, “The New Confl ict Managers: A Critical Assessment of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Methods under Workchoices,” in G. Michelson, S. Jamieson and J. Burgess, ed., New Employment 
Actors: Developments from Australia (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008).
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are being complied with. Inspectors have the power to initiate legal action 
to restrain certain conduct, impose penalties or recover outstanding monies. 
They also play a part in ensuring freedom of association and in facilitating 
a trade union’s right of entry to a workplace. It is vital that the powers of the 
inspectorate are harnessed within the seasonal worker scheme to facilitate 
compliance and enforcement. Similarly, local advisory boards will have 
signifi cant responsibilities of oversight of the scheme in particular localities, 
and can thus facilitate local compliance with regulatory processes and support 
dispute resolution mechanisms.
Beyond a pilot scheme?
The Australian seasonal worker scheme has been implemented as a pilot 
program and is scheduled to be reviewed to gauge its effectiveness in 
contributing to development goals, meeting labour shortages in particular 
industries, and addressing strategic priorities for the region. So far, there 
appear to have been genuine tri-partite efforts to ensure the pilot scheme 
becomes fully operational, but whether this can be sustained in the long 
term remains to be seen. This small pilot scheme has been estimated to cost 
the government alone AUD$23.6 million (including establishment, 
monitoring and evaluation),63 which is two-thirds of the estimated total wages 
bill of all 2,500 Pacifi c workers. It is an open question whether Australia—
once described as a “reluctant Pacifi c nation”64—will move beyond the pilot 
to a more permanent arrangement for facilitating labour migration in the 
Pacifi c. As Australia’s minister for foreign affairs has observed, the government 
has been pleased with the trial to date but has “a fair way to go before coming 
to a fi nal judgement about whether [it] could take that forward in any 
permanent way into the future”.65
The scheme was purposely introduced as a pilot—involving a small number 
of workers over a fi nite period—so that appropriate evaluation could be 
undertaken before implementing a more enduring program. Yet, even by 
the modest standards set, very low numbers of Pacifi c workers have been 
deployed in the Australian horticulture industry compared with the New 
Zealand scheme. The absence of Pacifi c workers from the start of the second 
successive harvest season in December 2009 has raised concerns about the 
viability of the scheme.
__________________
63 Australian Senate, Economic Challenges Facing Papua New Guinea and the Island States of the Southwest 
Pacifi c (Canberra: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 2009), p. 204.
64 G. Dobell, “The Reluctant Pacifi c Nation: Policy Taboos, Popular Amnesia and Political Failure,” 
Quadrant, vol. 47, no. 5 (2003), pp.16-23.
65 Stephen Smith MP, “Press Conference: The Hon Stephen Smith MP and Tongan Prime Minister 
Dr the Hon Feleti Sevele, Minister for Foreign Affairs” (Nuku’alofa: Department of Foreign Affairs, 
3 June 2009).
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In some respects the timing of Australia’s initiative has not been propitious. 
The domestic and regional goals of the scheme have to be delivered in the 
face of competition from a New Zealand program that started earlier, operates 
on a signifi cantly larger scale and builds on stronger ties with countries of 
the Pacifi c and with Pacifi c Island communities who have residents within 
New Zealand. In addition, the global fi nancial crisis has contributed to a 
gloomier labour market outlook than was the case when the pilot scheme 
was fi rst announced. A soft domestic labour market may mean there are 
fewer labour shortages that need to be fi lled using non-Australian labour. 
However, in the long term neither of these factors is likely to have a sustained 
impact on the viability of the Australian scheme. New Zealand is a small 
economy whose seasonal labour needs cannot meet the demand for 
employment by Pacifi c Island peoples. Moreover, the Australian economy 
has fared well in the global fi nancial crisis by international standards,66 and 
on balance it seems likely that there will continue to be labour shortages in 
the regional locations that the scheme is designed to serve and in the type 
of low skilled, low paid work to which the scheme is directed.
An evaluation of the pilot has been set up to examine whether the scheme 
is meeting its twin objectives of achieving development goals and increasing 
domestic labour supply. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the scheme has 
advocated a regulatory framework that is fair, effi cient and effective. This 
article has examined this regulatory environment from two perspectives: the 
arrangements that have been put in place specifi cally to address the seasonal 
migration of Pacifi c workers and the application of mainstream industrial 
regulations to those who arrive under the scheme. As noted earlier, these 
protections are a political necessity from the viewpoint of the government’s 
relations with Pacifi c neighbours, trade unions and the Australian public. 
They are also part of Australia’s general legal obligations to safeguard the 
rights of individuals who are present in its territory, including foreign workers. 
The regulatory framework outlined in this article indicates that a very high 
priority for the Australian government is to avoid any suggestion of, or 
opportunity for, exploitation of Pacifi c workers. This objective necessitates 
a high level of oversight and engagement by government departments, 
industry associations and labour organizations. An important consideration 
in evaluating the pilot is whether the type and level of regulation is sustainable 
if the scheme were to expand in size and duration.
As one of the objectives of the scheme is to meet local labour shortages, 
it is also important to consider the viability of the scheme from an industry 
perspective. The horticulture industry has traditionally been subject to 
limited regulation and has relied on a highly casualized and transient 
__________________
66 Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement on Monetary Policy, 7 August 2009 (Canberra: Reserve Bank 
of Australia, 2009).
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workforce. Industry sources are already saying that “red tape,” “delays,” 
“onerous government conditions” and “excessive micro-management [by 
government]” have made Pacifi c workers unattractive to growers.67 It has 
also been suggested that growers are reluctant to shoulder the fi nancial 
premium required to cover the travel and administration costs of bringing 
seasonal workers from the Pacifi c and that the mandatory use of labour hire 
companies as intermediaries has pushed up labour costs from $18 to over 
$22 per hour.68 These factors have the potential to drive growers back to 
their traditional sources of seasonal labour, including dubious contractors 
and undocumented workers. Ironically, it may be the very web of regulation 
that has been woven around the scheme to protect Pacifi c workers that may 
make their employment less attractive to growers.
There will always be a concern that temporary labour schemes create 
possibilities for exploiting vulnerable workers, especially if the demand for 
short-term labour is met by the movement of people across the “North–South” 
divide. Australia’s history, both recent and distant, is a palpable reminder of 
these risks. If Australia’s seasonal labour scheme is to bear fruit in the future, 
it is vital that it is nurtured today through a strong regulatory framework that 
is vigilantly monitored and enforced to avoid the slightest suggestion that 
they are the new “blackbirders.” To date, the pilot has been painstaking in 
its efforts to ensure the integrity of its protective framework, but opportunities 
for Pacifi c workers have been quite limited in practice. The forthcoming 
evaluation of the pilot will have to meet the challenge facing all temporary 
migration schemes, namely, how to enable foreign workers to exploit new 
employment opportunities without themselves being exploited. Hopefully 
this elusive goal does not lie beyond the reach of the scheme.
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, January 2010
__________________
67 T. Hyland, “Islander Work Scheme Bears No Fruit,” The Age (online), 22 November 2009, 
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is7z.html, last accessed 24 March 2010.
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